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Abstract
This study examines the process of economic development in an overlapping generations model
where higher physical capital involves pollution and deteriorates the productivity of education. In this
setting, households may not invest into education and multiple steady states of the physical/human
capital ratio can arise, leading long-run production with low initial endowment (physical capital) to
be higher than that with high initial endowment. This occurs because, owing to the low produc-
tivity of education caused by pollution, only physical capital accumulation occurs with high initial
endowment, while physical and human capital accumulation occur with low initial endowment. This
result is consistent with the resource curse. We also show that higher abatement technology can solve
the resource curse problem since it helps households redirect physical capital accumulation toward
human capital accumulation.
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1 Introduction
The phenomenon of the resource curse, the stylized fact that richer natural resources decrease
output and economic growth , often in developing countries, has been empirically studied by Sachs
and Warner (2001), Gylfason (2001), Mehlum et al. (2006), and Van der Ploeg (2011) among others.
Gylfason (2001) categorized four reasons for the resource curse: (1) the Dutch disease, (2) rent
seeking, (3) a reduction in the quality of government, and (4) neglect of education.
In this study, we focus on the fourth reason of Gylfason (2001), namely the neglect of educa-
tion. 1 To examine why richer natural resources crowd out education, we assume that they entail
pollution, which deteriorates the productivity of education. If we regard natural resources as oil, coal,
and natural gases, richer natural resources release poisonous substances and greenhouse gas emis-
sions; intuitively, a higher level of pollution decreases human capital such as education and health.
Empirically, there is a negative relationship between human capital accumulation, especially health
and education, and pollution intensity (e.g., Carrie et al. (2009), Gra and Niedell (2012), Beatty and
Shimshack (2014)). More pollution increases the risk of health and disasters, which negatively aects
the productivity of educational expenditure.
Based on the foregoing, in this study we construct an overlapping generations model that contains
pollution and human capital accumulation, and that admits zero educational expenditure in equilib-
rium by employing a linear human capital production function with a positive intercept. Such a human
capital production function used, for example, by Galor and Moav (2004) and Moav (2005), is char-
acterized by the existence of two properties: (i) basic skills and (ii) a finite marginal productivity of
educational expenditure (even at zero educational expenditure). By using this function, we examine
the relationship between human capital accumulation and pollution and obtain an entire dynamic path
of the physical/human capital ratio and human capital investment.
Based on this model, we show that three patterns of dynamics of the physical/human capital
ratio exist, while two steady states occur in one of these cases. In Regime 1, only physical capital
accumulates with high initial physical capital, whereas in Regime 2, both physical and human capital
1From the view of the Dutch disease, Sachs and Warner (1995) studied the resource curse theoretically. Mehlum et al.
(2005) did so from the view of rent seeking and Robinson et al. (2006, 2014) did so from the view of overconfidence (a
reduction in the quality of government).
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accumulate with low initial physical capital. Furthermore, we show that there is a parameter region in
which the production of the latter case exceeds that of the former case. Thus, an economy with high
initial endowment attains lower long-run production than one with low initial endowment, which is
indeed a resource curse because high initial endowment results in lower long-run production. Since
the resource curse problem is a poverty trap, it should be addressed by implementing policy. From this
perspective, we show that higher abatement technology, which implies a lower marginal reduction in
the productivity of education caused by pollution, with no cost can solve the resource curse problem.
The implementation of such technology not only increases long-run production in Regime 2, but
also makes a regime shift likely to occur. This is because higher abatement technology increases the
productivity of education and helps households redirect physical capital accumulation toward human
capital accumulation, which in turn shifts the regime and increases the long-run production.
Some models treat human capital accumulation and pollution at the same time in order to analyze
these relationships (Gradus and Smulders (1993), Bovenverg and Smulders (1995), Schou (2000),
Ikefuji and Horii (2012), Sapci (2013). In these models, Ramsey model is used, and (at least asymp-
totically) endogenous growth generates. These analyze how the parameters of pollution and policies
aect the growth rate of production. In such models, however dirty the economy is, positive human
capital investment is required in equilibrium. As these models are an extension of the Uzawa–Lucas
model and the economy is on the balanced growth path in the long run, educational expenditure must
be positive in order not to lead to a zero growth rate, which means that multiple steady states do not
occur. Thus, we cannot use such models to analyze an environmental trap such as the resource curse.
By contrast, the presented model can admit zero educational expenditure with multiple steady states.
This is one of the contributions of this study. Although Ran (2012) constructed a model similar
to the one we construct, her model considered an endogenous mitigation policy instead of physical
capital accumulation and concentrated on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), 2 which we also
mention in Section 3.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and obtains
dynamic equations that describe the equilibrium of this economy. Section 3 shows the comparative
2The EKC is an inverse U-shaped relationship between production (or economic growth) and pollution, as pointed by
Grossman and Kruger (1995) and others. That is, an economy with low production grows with higher production and
pollution, while an economy with high production grows with higher production and lower pollution.
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statics with respect to abatement technology and discusses the problem of the resource curse and, at
the same time, briefly the EKC. Section 4 summarizes the findings and concludes.
2 The Model
The model is described by discrete time and closed economy. There exist a household and a firm. We
employ two-period overlapping generations model with altruism. The initial population is one and
the population does not grow. Two types of capital exist, namely physical and human capital, both of
which depreciate completely after one period. Physical capital accumulation accompanies pollution,
which decreases the productivity of human capital investment.
2.1 A firm
A final good is produced by using physical capital Kt, which is also interpreted as resources, 3 and
human capital Ht as follows.
Yt = AKt H1 t = Ht f (kt); (1)
where kt  Kt=Ht is the physical/human capital ratio and f (kt)  F(Kt; Ht)=Ht is production per unit
of human capital. Then, the profit maximization conditions are given by
rt = Ak 1t  r(kt); (2)
wt = A(1   )kt  w(kt); (3)
where rt is the rental rate and wt is the wage per unit of human capital.
2.2 A household
We call the generation born in period t   1 the t-generation. In period t   1, t-generation does not
consume and receives education from her parent. We assume that the parent is altruistic and that she
gains utility not only from her own consumption but also from her ospring’s income. Then, in period
t, the parent decides her consumption ct, educational expenditure to her ospring et+1, and transfer
3To regard Kt as (natural) resources, let us assume that natural resources, especially fossil fuels, are openly available
but specific equipment is required to extract it. That is, Kt is like an oilrig or heavy machinery. Then, the amount of Kt is
proportional to that of resources.
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to her ospring st+1. When we denote ht as human capital per capita, t-generation has the following
utility function. 4
ut = (1   ) ln ct +  ln(wt+1ht+1 + rt+1st+1): (4)
The parameter  2 (0; 1) is the degree of altruism; that is, higher  implies stronger altruism. The
budget constraint is given by
wtet+1 + st+1 + ct = wtht + rt st  It: (5)
The right-hand side (RHS) is t-generation’s income, which we denote It, and the left-hand side (LHS)
is a composite of expenditure that consists of educational expenditure, the transfer for the ospring,
and consumption. Educational expenditure incurs an educational cost wt following Moav (2005),
Galor and Weil (2000), and De la Croix and Doepke (2003).
The human capital production function is given by
ht+1 = h(et+1; kt); (6)
where it is assumed that h1 > 0, h11  0, h2 < 0, h(0; kt) = 1, and h1(0; kt) 2 (0;1). 5 Three
points are worth mentioning on this production function. Firstly, we assume that the human capital
formed in the next period, h(et+1; kt), is decreasing in not pollution level Kt, but in the physical/human
capital ratio kt, which reflects two eect. One is that more physical capital stock Kt reduces the level
of human capital. In reality, more physical capital, or resources such as oil, tends to cause more
pollution, which reduces the productivity of education. The negative relationship between ht+1 and
Kt reflects this actual tendency. The other is that a positive knowledge spillover from the previous
knowledge, that is, Ht+1, is increasing in Ht. In this production function, the homogeneity of degree 0
between Kt and Ht is assumed and hence Ht+1 depends directly on physical capital per unit of human
capital kt. Secondly, even if a parent does not invest into education, et+1 = 0, her ospring attains a
basic skill, which is normalized to 1. Here, it is assumed that a basic skill is unaected by the intensity
4We do not consider the negative direct eect of pollution on utility in contrast to John and Pecchenino (1994), and
Prieur and Brechet (2013). As long as a disutility from pollution is introduced in an additively separable form such as
ut + (Kt), such an introduction does not aect the equation stated below. If we introduce it in a non-separable form, it
can aect the utility maximization condition; however this makes this model solution too complicated despite having less
interesting implications, and hence we omit this eect.
5Such a human capital production function is also employed by Galor and Moav (2001) and Moav (2005).
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of pollution Kt for simplicity., which is expressed by h(0; kt) = 1. Finally, the marginal productivity
of educational expenditure at zero is positive and finite for any kt; h1(0; kt) 2 (0;1). This fact implies
that the Inada condition is not satisfied and that a household may decide zero educational expenditure
optimally. In equation (9), we specify the form of human capital production function.
The utility maximization problem for t-generation is given by
max
fct ;et+1;st+1g
(4)
s,t, (5), (6), et+1  0 and st+1 > 0, given st > 0; et  0:
Before solving this model, note that st+1 must be an interior solution since, otherwise, production
per unit of human capital becomes zero and at that time, the interest rate becomes infinity and the
household should save, which contradicts st+1 = 0. Then, from the first-order conditions in et+1 and
st+1 and the profit maximization conditions, we have 6
et+1 =
8>><>>:0 if w(kt)r(kt+1) > w(kt+1)h1(0; kt)> 0 if w(kt)r(kt+1) = w(kt+1)h1(0; kt): (7)
This equation is easy to understand. One unit of educational expenditure from zero increases the
income of the ospring by wt+1h1(0; kt). At the same time, since one unit of educational expenditure
costs a parent an educational cost wt, the resultant marginal benefit for a parent to invest educational
expenditure from zero is given by wt+1h1(0; kt)=wt. On the contrary, since more educational expen-
diture crowds out transfers for the ospring, the child’s income decreases by rt+1. If the former
dominates the latter, educational expenditure arises and vice versa.
From the first-order conditions of consumption and transfers, each of which holds with equality,
and from the budget constraint, ct = It   wtet+1   st+1 we obtain
st+1 = (It   wtet+1)   (1   )wt+1
rt+1
h(et+1; kt): (8)
Hereafter, the human capital production function is specified as follows.
h(et+1; kt) = 1 + 1
 1 + vkt
et+1: (9)
6The case that wtrt+1 < wt+1h1(0; kt) cannot occur since then the Kuhn–Tucker multiplier for educational expenditure
would become negative, which would contradict one of the optimality conditions. Indeed, st+1 > 0 excludes this case, for
under wtrt+1 < wt+1h1(0; kt), even at et+1 = 0, the marginal benefit from education dominates that from a transfer, and hence,
st+1 becomes zero.
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In the above specification,  denotes the marginal productivity of educational expenditure with-
out pollution h1jv=0 = . Moreover, v denotes the vulnerability to damage from pollution. A higher v
implies more severe damage given the same physical/human capital ratio kt.Conversely, higher abate-
ment technology, which decreases the damage caused by pollution, is represented by a decrease in v.
From (9) and the profit maximizing conditions, the condition under which educational expenditure is
positive, et+1 > 0, becomes
kt+1  ( 1 + vkt) f (kt)  (kt): (10)
The function (kt) is an increasing function, and is concave for small kt and convex for large kt. 7 Since
we specify the human capital production function as a linear function of educational expenditure as
(9), the term et+1 no longer exists in (10). The inequality (10) must hold if educational expenditure
is positive for the following reasons. The current capital stock per unit of human capital kt has
two negative eects on the incentive to spend on education. One is that more current capital stock
accompanies more pollution, which reduces the marginal eciency of educational expenditure. The
other is that more capital stock increases the opportunity cost for educational expenditure given by
w(kt). Only when the next capital stock is suciently high such that the next wage w(kt+1) dominates
these two negative eects from the current capital stock, can positive educational expenditure arise.
When kt+1 < (kt), there exists no educational expenditure. That is, et+1 = 0. Given that t   1
generation has educational expenditure et  0, from (8), the transfer is given by
st+1 = It   (1   )wt+1
rt+1
= [wth(et; kt 1) + rt st]   (1   )wt+1
rt+1
:
The physical capital market-clearing condition is
kt =
st
h(et; kt 1) ; kt+1 =
st+1
h(0; kt) = st+1:
Therefore, by using profit maximization conditions, the dynamics of kt under zero educational expen-
7The second derivative of (kt) is given by
00(kt) = A2k 2t [(1 + )vkt   (1   ) 1]:
Hence, the inflection point is given by kt = (1   )=[(1 + )v] > 0.
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diture are
kt+1 = [w(kt) + r(kt)kt]h(et; kt 1)   (1   )w(kt+1)
r(kt+1)
=  f (kt)h(et; kt 1)   (1   )1   

kt+1:
By solving the above expression for kt+1, the dynamics of the physical/human capital ratio become
kt+1 =

 + (1   )(1   ) f (kt)h(et; kt 1)  (kt)h(et; kt 1); (11)
where (kt)   f (kt)=[+ (1  )(1  )] is an increasing and concave function. Furthermore, if the
previous educational expenditure is 0, that is et = 0, (11) can be simplified to
kt+1 = (kt): (12)
On the contrary, if et > 0, then as shown later, kt = (kt 1) must be satisfied in the previous period,
and (11) becomes
kt+1 = h(et;  1(kt))(kt);
, where  1() is an inverse function of (). 8
Once kt+1  (kt) is realized, positive educational expenditure arises, that is, et+1 > 0. In such
a case, the optimal transfer must satisfy kt+1 = (kt). Otherwise, that is, if kt+1 > (kt) holds, the
marginal utility from educational expenditure dominates that of the transfer, and hence, st+1 becomes
0. However, since st+1 must be an interior solution as mentioned before, it is contradictory. In this
case, from (8) and the profit maximization conditions, the transfer is given by
st+1 = [w(kt)h(et; kt 1) + r(kt)st   w(kt)et+1]   (1   )w(kt+1)
r(kt+1) h(et+1; kt):
If educational expenditure is positive in the previous period, et > 0, then kt = (kt 1), equivalently
kt 1 =  1(kt), and
st+1 = [w(kt)h(et;  1(kt)) + r(kt)st   w(kt)et+1]   (1   )w(kt+1)
r(kt+1) h(et+1; kt):
The physical capital market-clearing condition is
kt+1 =
st+1
h(et+1; kt) , st+1 = kt+1h(et+1; kt):
8The inverse function  1(kt) can be derived by solving kt = (kt 1) for kt 1. Although we cannot obtain an explicit form
of  1(kt 1), since (kt) is monotonically increasing, the inverse function exists.
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Hence,
(kt)h(et+1; kt) = [w(kt)h(et;  1(kt)) + r(kt)kth(et;  1(kt))   w(kt)et+1]   (1   )w(kt+1)
r(kt+1) h(et+1; kt):
Substituting the profit maximization conditions, and the definition of (kt) and h(et+1; kt), and then
solving the resultant expression for et+1 lead to
et+1 = h(et;  1(kt))   [ + (1   )(1   )]( 1 + vkt): (13)
This equation is a dynamic equation of educational expenditure et+1 when et , 0, and the case where
no educational expenditure is in the previous period, et = 0, is the same equation as (13) with et = 0.
To simplify the dynamics of the physical/human capital ratio, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The economy starts with zero educational expenditure; e0 = 0 and positive physical
capital stock K0 > 0.
This assumption also implies that the initial physical/human capital ratio is positive since k0 =
K0=H0 = K0 > 0 given that H0 = h(0; k 1) = 1 irrespective of k 1.
We can divide the regime based on whether educational expenditure is positive or zero. We call
the regime where t-generation receives no education (et = 0) Regime 1 in period t. By contrast, when
t-generation receives an education (et > 0), we call this regime Regime 2. Since we assume e0 = 0,
the economy is in Regime 1 in the initial period. When t-generation with no educational expenditure
invests in educational expenditure for her ospring, et+1 > 0, the economy shifts from Regime 1 to
Regime 2. Once the economy moves to Regime 2, it follows kt+1 = (kt) and stays in Regime 2 until
et+1 = 0 is optimal.
In Regime 1, the dynamics are described by kt+1 = h(et; kt 1)(kt) and et+1 = 0. In particular, if
the parent has no education, et = 0, the economy follows kt+1 = (kt). Since (kt) is increasing and
concave with (0) = 0, this economy monotonically converges to its steady state k1, which is given
by
k1 =
 
A
 + (1   )(1   )
!1=(1 )
:
For the economy to shift from Regime 1 to Regime 2, the parent with no education must have an
incentive to invest into education for her ospring. Then, how does the parent decide to invest into
8
Figure 1: (kt) and (kt) when ¯k > 0 Figure 2: Two positive steady–state values of k2
education ? To answer this, we define ¯k as follows:
(¯k) = (¯k) , ¯k = 1
v
 

 + (1   )(1   )   
 1
!
: (14)
The threshold ¯k is uniquely determined, which implies that if (kt) and (kt) intersect, only one point
arises. Therefore, by considering the curvature of (kt), if ¯k > 0, the positional relationship shown in
Figure 1 is realized. Hereafter, we focus on the parameter values such that ¯k > 0. Hence, we assume
the following.
Assumption 2 Assume that ¯k > 0. That is,

 + (1   )(1   ) > 
 1: (A.1)
This assumption guarantees that (kt) and (kt) must intersect at ¯k > 0. In other words, the
positional relationship in Figure 1 holds. Then, we show the following lemma corresponding to the
shift from Regime 1 to Regime 2.
Lemma 1 If the economy is in Regime 1 in period t, that is, et = 0, the economy with Kt > ¯k has
no educational expenditure (stays in Regime 1), while the one with Kt  ¯k has positive educational
expenditure (shifts to Regime 2).
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Proof.
Since we assume that et = 0, if educational expenditure is paid, from (13), et+1 =    [ + (1  
)(1   )]( 1 + vkt) holds. Hence, at kt = ¯k, et+1 = 0, that is, educational expenditure becomes
zero. Further, since et+1 is decreasing in kt, when kt > ¯k, et+1 becomes negative. However, negative
educational expenditure is not admitted and et+1 is zero. On the contrary, when kt < ¯k, et+1 becomes
positive. 
Lemma 1 states that when the level of physical capital is low in Regime 1, the economy is likely
to shift to Regime 2 because it has less pollution with low physical capital, which induces human
capital accumulation due to a lower decrease in the marginal productivity of education. Next, we
consider the shift from Regime 2 to Regime 1. To show the regime shift, we again use (13) and obtain
the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If the economy is in Regime 2 in period t, that is, et > 0, when h(et;  1(kt))(kt) 
(kt) is satisfied, positive educational expenditure arises (stays in Regime 2). On the contrary, when
h(et;  1(kt))(kt) < (kt) is satisfied, educational expenditure becomes zero (shifts to Regime 1).
Proof.
From (13), if et > 0, et+1 becomes as follows.
et+1 = h(et;  1(kt))   [ + (1   )(1   )]( 1 + kt)
=
 + (1   )(1   )
 f (kt)
 
h(et;  1(kt)) 
 + (1   )(1   ) f (kt)   (
 1 + kt) f (kt)
!
=
 + (1   )(1   )
 f (kt)

h(et;  1(kt))(kt)   (kt)

:
Since k0 > 0 and kt do not converge to zero, f (kt) must be positive for all t, and hence if h(et;  1(kt))(kt) >
(kt) is satisfied, positive educational expenditure is realized, while if h(et;  1(kt))(kt) < (kt) is sat-
isfied, zero or negative educational expenditure arises. However, since educational expenditure cannot
be negative, educational expenditure becomes zero, and hence, when h(et;  1(kt))(kt) < (kt), the
optimal educational expenditure is zero. 
As shown in Figure 3, the condition that h(et;  1(kt))(kt)  (kt) implies that a relatively low
physical/human capital ratio kt is realized when the economy is in Regime 2. Similar to the logic of
Lemma 1, since the economy is not as polluted in this case, it can invest into education. Note that
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even when kt = ¯k, educational expenditure is positive, that is, if the economy is in Regime 2, there is
positive education and the economy stays in Regime 2 at kt = ¯k in contrast to Lemma 1. 9
In Regime 2, the physical/human capital ratio is determined by kt+1 = (kt). The steady–state
level of the physical/human capital ratio in Regime 2 is given by
k2 = (k2);, k21  = A( 1 + vk2): (15)
From Figure 2, we can obtain at most two fixed points of (kt). We do not ignore the case of no fixed
points, and if any, we label two fixed points as k2 and k
+
2 , where k
+
2 > k

2.
10 From Figure 2, we
confirm that higher vulnerability v leads to an increase in k2 and a decrease in k
+
2 since a higher v
shifts (kt) downward.
2.3 Dynamics of kt
There exist three patterns of dynamics of the physical/human capital kt, and we focus on the case
where multiple steady states are generated. Let us assume that (kt) has two distinct fixed points,
namely k2 and k
+
2 exist, and that ¯k < k

1.
11 The phase diagram of kt in this case is depicted in Figure
3. Depending on the initial capital stock K0 = k0, we can classify the following three patterns of
transitional dynamics.
1. k0 > ¯k: In this case, (k0) > (k0) and the economy stays in Regime 1 according to Lemma 1.
Since in the transition, (kt) > (kt) holds, the economy follows the dynamics that kt+1 = (kt)
and monotonically converges to k1.
9Under kt = ¯k, educational expenditure is positive for any et > 0 since
et+1 =
1
f

¯k
 h(et;  1(¯k))(¯k)   (¯k)
=


¯k

f

¯k
 h(et;  1(¯k))   1 = 
 + (1   )(1   )
et
 1 + v 1

¯k
 > 0;
where the second equality holds since (¯k) = (¯k) from the definition of ¯k. This fact implies that when the economy is in
Regime 2, the economy does not shift into Regime 1 and stays in Regime 2 even under kt = ¯k.
10Strictly speaking, we ignore the case of only one fixed point. This case arises only when the derivative of (kt) is equal
to 1 at the fixed point. Such a condition is knife-edge, and hence we do not consider this case. However, by using a similar
procedure to that stated below, we can treat this case.
11The cases in which (kt) has two distinct fixed points but ¯k > k1, and in which (kt) has no fixed points are analyzed in
Appendix 1. There, it is shown that for any k0, the economy eventually converges to k2 in the former case, and it converges
to k1 in the latter case.
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2. k+2 < k0 < ¯k: In this case, since (k0) > (k0), and from Lemma 1, the economy shifts to
Regime 2 initially. Then, the economy follows kt+1 = (kt), and since k+2 is unstable and
the considered region is higher than k+2 , the economy tends to diverge. However, as shown
in the next subsection, since educational expenditure falls as kt accumulates, in finite time
the optimal educational expenditure, et becomes zero. Thus, such a divergence does not last
forever. Explicitly, when educational expenditure is positive in period T but is zero in period
T + 1, that is eT+1 = 0 with a physical/human capital ratio kT , the function h(eT+1; kT )(kT+1)
becomes (kT+1); then, in period T + 1, (kT+1) > (kT+1) must be satisfied. This fact implies
that before period T +1 is period Te, which satisfies (kt) < h(et; kt 1)(kt) in period t < Te, and
after period Te, (kt) > h(et; kt 1)(kt). Then, from Lemma 2, the economy shifts to Regime
1 in period Te, and after period Te + 1, the economy follows kt = (kt) and monotonically
converges to k1.
3. k0 < k+2 : In this case, the economy also shifts to Regime 2 initially since (k0) > (k0).
However, now that k0 < k+2 , the economy moves to the other stable steady state k

2. For
k0 < k2, kt monotonically increases, while for k0 2 (k2; k+2 ), kt monotonically decreases toward
k2.
Hence, if ¯k < k1, that is, if the threshold at which the household decides not to invest into ed-
ucation is low, multiple steady state are generated. If the initial physical capital is suciently low
such that k0 < k+2 , the economy is always (except for period 0) in Regime 2, while the economy is
eventually in Regime 1 if the initial physical capital is high such that k0 > k+2 . This fact implies that
the long-run physical/human capital ratio with low initial physical capital is less than the long-run
physical capital with high initial physical capital. This results in greater production per unit of human
capital f (kt) with high k0 than with low k0. However, this does not imply that long-run production
with low k0 is less than that with high k0 since human capital is accumulated in the case of low k0, and
thus the resultant production can be larger than that with high k0. We analyze this point in Section 3.
In summary, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2. Further, assume that (kt) has two distinct fixed points,
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Figure 3: The phase diagram of kt when (kt) has two distinct fixed points and ¯k < k1
and ¯k < k1. Then, the economy with k0 < k
+
2 converges to k

2, and the economy with k0 > k
+
2
converges to k1:
2.4 Dynamics of et
In Regime 2, educational expenditure is positive and we must consider the dynamics of educational
expenditure et, (13). Since the physical/human capital ratio kt is predetermined independently of
educational expenditure, we can treat kt as an exogenously determined variable. When the economy
shifts to Regime 2 in initial period, kt < ¯k is realized. Hereafter, we consider the case that the two
fixed points of (kt) are less than ¯k, that is, k+ < ¯k. Slightly rewriting (13) yields
et+1 =

 1 + v 1(kt)
et +
h
   [ + (1   )(1   )( 1 + vkt)
i
 et+1(et; kt): (16)
By regarding kt as an exogenous variable because kt is a predetermined variable, et+1 is linear in et
with intercept    [ + (1   )(1   )]( 1 + vkt). Note that when kt < ¯k, this intercept is positive.
Since the slope and intercept of (16) are decreasing in kt, if the economy starts with k0 < k2, over
time, the intercept decreases toward    [ + (1   )(1   )]( 1 + vk2) and the slope becomes flat
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toward =( 1 + vk2). 12 The condition that educational expenditure converges to its steady state( i.e.,
the slope of (16) becomes less than 1) is given by  1 + vk2 > . In this case, the steady–state value
of educational expenditure is obtained by substituting et = et+1 = e and kt = k2 into (16) as
e = [   [ + (1   )(1   )]( 1 + vk2)]
 1 + vk2
 1 + vk2   
: (17)
From the convergence condition,  1 + vk2 > , the denominator of (17) is positive, and since k2 is
less than ¯k, the term    [ + (1   )(1   )]( 1 + vk2) is also positive. Hence, e is positive. The
steady-state value of human capital is given by
h = (1   ) 
 1 + vk2
 1 + vk2   
: (18)
On the contrary, when the slope of (16) at kt = k2 is larger than one, that is,  >  1+vk2, educational
expenditure diverges. In such a case, instead of the steady-state value of educational expenditure, we
can obtain the long-run growth rate of educational expenditure as follows:
lim
t!1
et+1
et
=

 1 + vk2
 ge > 1: (19)
Furthermore, human capital grows at the same rate as educational expenditure in the long run, for
lim
t!1
ht+1
ht
= lim
et!1
 1 + vk2 + geet
 1 + vk2 + et
= ge; (20)
where the second equality holds from L’Hoˆpital’s rule.
Note that when kt diverges beyond ¯k, educational expenditure becomes zero in finite time. In the
period that kt = ¯k, the intercept of (16) is zero, while the slope of (16) is positive. 13 Hence, if previous
educational expenditure is positive, in the period that kt = ¯k, positive educational expenditure arises.
However, for kt > ¯k, the intercept of (16) becomes negative, although the slope of (16) is still positive.
This finding implies that the optimal educational expenditure becomes zero in finite time. Since
educational expenditure cannot be negative, zero educational expenditure arises thereafter. Once the
economy shifts to Regime 1, it follows kt = (kt) and kt monotonically increases toward k1. Hence,
on the transition after the regime shift, there is no incentive for the parent to invest into education
since the level of physical/human capital is much higher than the level that she gives up investing into
education for her ospring.
12Note that  1(k2) = k2 since k2 is a fixed point of (kt).
13From the definition of ¯k, the slope of e(et; ¯k) is given by + (1  )(1  ), which is less than one. For kt < ¯k, the slope
e(et; kt) is larger than  + (1   )(1   ) since k2 < ¯k must hold to stay in Regime 2.
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2.5 Long-run production
Finally, we derive long-run production in Regimes 1 and 2. In the long run, the physical/human
capital ratio converges to k1 in Regime 1 and to k

2 in Regime 2. Since educational expenditure is zero
in Regime 1, long-run production in Regime 1 is given by
Y1 = f (k1) = Ak1 = A
 
A
 + (1   )(1   )
!=(1 )
:
In Regime 2, there exist two scenarios, namely et ! 1 and et ! e. In the former case, long-run
production grows at the same rate as human capital ge, since it is a product of human capital and
production per unit of human capital, which is constant. In the latter case, the production per unit of
human capital is less than that in Regime 1, f (k2) < f (k1); however, now human capital accumulation
arises as in (18). When et ! e, long-run production in Regime 2 is given by
Y2 = h
 f (k2) =
(1   )

k2
 1 + vk2   
; (21)
where we use f (k2) = k2=[( 1 + vk2)] from the steady state condition, (15).
3 Resource curse problem
3.1 Resource curse problem
The previous subsection implied that whether long-run production in Regime 1 is lower than that
in Regime 2 is ambiguous. That is, long-run production in Regime 1 could be larger less than that
in Regime 2, although the initial resources (physical capital) is higher in Regime 1 than Regime 2.
This phenomenon is known as resource curse since high initial resource allocation eventually leads
to lower production than that with low initial resource allocation. When the economy is in Regime 1
in the long run though Y2 > Y

1 , the resource curse problem arises. Then, in which parameter region
is the resource curse likely to occur? Moreover, if the economy lapses into the resource curse case, is
it solvable, and if so, how? We examine these problems in this subsection.
Naturally, when et diverges, production in Regime 2 must be larger than that in Regime 1 in the
long run. Production in Regime 1 converges to a positive value, while that in Regime 2 diverges at the
same growth rate as human capital ge. In such a case, the resource curse occurs. Hereafter, we show
that even in the case of et ! e, there is room for the resource curse. Long-run production in Regime
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2 (21) contains not only A, , and , but also v and , which are not contained in long-run production
in Regime 1, and we concentrate on the vulnerability from pollution, v. As shown in equation (Ap.1)
in Appendix 2, we obtain the following sign or the derivatives:
@Y2
@v
< 0: (22)
This fact implies that less vulnerability can cause the resource curse since this change increases long-
run production in Regime 2 Y2 , while production in Regime 1 Y

1 is unaected. Hence, lower v is
more likely to cause the resource curse problem. 14 Inequality (22) is intuitive, but still somewhat
interesting. If vulnerability becomes small, the parent wants to invest into education, and hence
she increases educational expenditure and decreases the transfer. Hence, human capital increases
and physical capital decreases, making the change in long-run production ambiguous. However,
according to (22), an increase in human capital must dominate a decrease in physical capital.
3.2 Comparative dynamics
In what follows, we show that higher abatement technology can not only increase production in
Regime 2 but also make the economy shift from Regime 1 to Regime 2. Higher abatement technol-
ogy implies less vulnerability to pollution, leading to a decrease in v. As shown in (22), production in
Regime 2 is decreasing with respect to v. Thus, higher abatement technology can increase production
in Regime 2. Furthermore, the lower v becomes, the greater is the likelihood that educational expen-
diture diverges because the divergence condition of educational expenditure is given by  1+vk2 < ,
and a lower v implies lower vk2, where it is verified that @vk

2=@v > 0. Therefore, by using higher
abatement technology, this inequality is likely to be satisfied, which implies a higher possibility of
the resource curse problem arising given that the economy has remained in the same regime.
Even if we concentrate on the case that educational expenditure does not diverge, the resource
curse problem can be solved. From Figure 2, we can obtain a negative sign of the derivatives of k+2
14If we calculate the condition that long-run welfare in Regime 2 is higher than that in Regime 1, we have the following:
Y2 >
 

( 1 + vk2)( + (1   )(1   ))
!1 
Y1 :
Since the coecient of Y1 is larger than one, even when an economy has the resource curse problem, that is, Y2 > Y1 ,
although the economy is in Regime 1, this does not necessarily imply that to shift the regime improve its welfare. However,
higher abatement technology decreases the coecient of Y1 , meaning that an introduction of suciently high abatement
technology can help the economy escape from the resource curse and improve its welfare.
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Figure 4: The comparative dynamics in the case of a decrease in v.
with respect to v, that is,
@k+2
@v
< 0:
The threshold at which educational expenditure occurs in the long run when the initial physical/capital
stock falls below it (see Proposition 1), k+2 , is decreasing in v. That is, higher abatement technology
widens makes the region in which positive educational expenditure arises and the economy is thus
likely to shift to Regime 2. A similar eect arises when the marginal productivity of educational
expenditure  increases.
The comparative dynamics are illustrated in Figure 4. Consider the dynamics of kt that has multi-
ple steady states. Suppose, first, that the economy is in the steady state in Regime 1 with the resource
curse problem (i.e., the economy is at point E1 in Figure 4 with Y2 > Y1 ). Then higher abatement
technology (i.e., a decrease in v) is introduced. As shown before, since production in Regime 2 is
decreasing in v, higher abatement technology guarantees Y2 > Y

1 . Since @¯k=@ < 0 and (kt) do
not depend on v, the decrease in v leads to a shift of (kt) downward, as shown in Figure 4 (a shift
from (kt) to ˜(kt)), while (kt) remains unchanged. Furthermore, Figure 4 depicts the case where the
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resultant ¯k0(> ¯k) exceeds k1. Then, after the parameter changes, now that (k1) > 0(k1) at point E1,
the economy shifts to Regime 2 according to Lemma 1, and the economy monotonically converges
to k2
0(< k2) thereafter, which is point E2 in Figure 4. As for educational expenditure, the intercept
of (16) shifts upward and the slope of it becomes steeper, which implies an overall increase in edu-
cational expenditure. Although the steady-state level of kt decreases in comparison with the original
point, positive educational expenditure arises, and the resultant long-run output must be higher than
the original one.
In summary, the following proposition is derived.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, higher abatement technology increases
long-run production in Regime 2 Y2 , and the resulting threshold of the physical/human capital ratio
k+2 . That is, higher abatement technology can solve the resource curse problem.
Moreover, the comparative dynamics implies the EKC. Assume that an economy has an initial
capital stock of f¯k; k1g and that the economy evolves in Regime 1 initially. Since k0 < k1, the econ-
omy monotonically increases toward k1, and hence production monotonically rises. By contrast, the
eective pollution, which is given by the ratio of pollution and human capital level vkt, also rises
since kt monotonically increases in the transition. Here assume that at some time, for example, at
time , higher abatement technology is introduced and v decreases exogenously. As shown before,
suciently higher abatement technology shifts the economy from Regime 1 to Regime 2. Then, since
k2 < ¯k and the resulting steady-state level of the physical/human capital ratio in Regime 2 k

2
0 is less
than k2, kt monotonically decreases after  and the eective pollution vkt also decreases. If the result-
ing long-run production in Regime 2, Y2 (k20), is higher than production in period , Y1(), in finite
time after , production must also increase. Thus, in early periods, the economy grows with higher
production and pollution, and in late periods, it grows with higher production and less pollution,
which is consistent with the EKC.
The EKC arises from the following reason. In early periods, the economy has high pollution
and a parent leaves a transfer to her ospring instead of investing into education. Then, physical
capital accumulates more and pollution increases. However, if suciently high abatement technology
is introduced, the parent finds it beneficial to invest into education and redirects the transfer for her
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ospring toward educational expenditure; hence, pollution decreases, while production still increases.
This mechanism is similar to that proposed by Ran (2012), although the EKC arises endogenously
in her model since mitigation policy is determined endogenously. 15
4 Conclusion
In this study, we construct a model that contains pollution from resources (physical capital) accumula-
tion and a human capital production function that admits zero educational expenditure in equilibrium.
Unlike previous studies that treat pollution and human capital accumulation simultaneously, depend-
ing on the initial endowment k0, one case generates multiple steady states in this model. We define
Regime 1 as the regime in which only physical capital is accumulated and Regime 2 as the regime
where both physical and human capital are accumulated. Then, an economy with low initial physical
capital shifts to Regime 2 and that with high initial physical capital stays in Regime 1 in the long
run. Although the level of the physical/human capital ratio in Regime 1 is larger than that in Regime
2, there is positive educational expenditure in Regime 2, and long-run production in Regime 2 may
be larger than that in Regime 1. In such a case, the resource curse problem occurs because of the
pollution derived from the use of physical capital.
Further, we show that higher abatement technology (and greater productivity of educational ex-
penditure) enables the economy not only to increase long-run production in Regime 2 but also to shift
from Regime 1 to Regime 2 by raising a productivity of educational expenditure and by a house-
hold redirecting a transfer toward educational expenditure. That is, by employing higher abatement
technology, the economy can overcome the resource curse problem.
There are two limitations of this model. Firstly, we assume that the amount of physical capital is
equal to that of natural resources. Hence, we cannot treat the eect stemmed from a scarcity of natural
resources. Secondly, we consider an exogenous mitigation policy in this model. In fact, a parent or
the government endogenously decides it. Therefore, it is interesting to construct and analyze a model
which also contains a stock of natural resource and/or an endogenous mitigation policy. These studies
15It is possible to introduce an endogenous mitigation policy into this model by setting vulnerability v as a decreasing
function of mitigation policy and letting the parent choose mitigation policy in parallel with her consumption, transfers,
and educational expenditure in order to maximize her utility. However, this makes the dynamics of this model somewhat
complicated and is beyond the scope of this study.
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are left to future works.
Appendices
A.1 Other dynamics of kt
In the text, we focus on the dynamics of kt, which generate multiple steady states by assuming that
(kt) has two distinct fixed points and k1 > ¯k. Here, we examine the other two dynamics of kt. The
first pattern is the case that (kt) has two distinct fixed points, while ¯k > k1. The second pattern is the
case that (kt) has no fixed points.
The first case of the dynamics of kt is illustrated in Figure 5. In Figure 5, the line h(et;  1(kt))(kt)
is not shown since we do not need to consider it. In this case for any k0, the economy converges to k2.
To show this, we divide the case depending on the value of initial capital k0.
1. k0 2 [0; ¯k]: In this case, since k0  ¯k, (k0) > (k0) holds, and it is optimal to shift to Regime
2 initially. However, since k+2 > ¯k > k0 and the steady state of k

2 is stable, this economy
converges to k2.
2. k0 > ¯k: In this case, since k0 > ¯k, the economy is initially in Regime 1 and monotonically
decreases toward k1. However, k

1 <
¯k implies that at some period, the level of capital stock
falls below ¯k before it reaches k1. At that time, (kt) > (kt) is realized, and according to
Lemma 1, it is optimal to shift from Regime 1 to Regime 2. After that, since ¯k < k+2 as in
Figure 5 and k2 is stable, this economy converges to k

2.
Consequently, in the second case, the economy converges to k2 regardless of k0. This fact implies that
if ¯k > k1, that is, if the threshold at which the parent decides not to invest into education is high, the
economy is in Regime 2 in the long run for any initial physical capital.
To examine the case where (kt) has no fixed points, let us divide the dynamics into the cases of
¯k < k1 and ¯k > k

1. The phase diagram of the case that ¯k < k

1 is illustrated in Figure 6, in which
(kt) does not cross the 45-degree line. For k0 < ¯k, as in the previous case, the economy shifts to
Regime 2 in the initial period and follows kt+1 = (kt). However, as explained in subsection 2.3, such
a divergence is feasible only at period t < Te, which is defined in the text. In period Te, the economy
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Figure 5: The phase diagram of kt when (kt) has two distinct fixed points and ¯k > k1
shifts from Regime 2 to Regime 1; then, after Te + 1, it follows kt+1 = (kt) and kt monotonically
converges to k1. For k0 > ¯k, the economy stays in Regime 1 and monotonically converges to k

1. That
is, for any level of initial physical capital, the economy eventually converges to k1.
Next, we consider the case of ¯k > k1. When ¯k > k

1, (kt) must have fixed points. That is, the
case that (kt) has no fixed points and that ¯k > k1 is infeasible. To show this, see Figure 4. From the
definition of ¯k, (kt) must pass the coordinate (¯k; (¯k)). However, it is impossible that (kt) passes this
point without crossing the 45-degree line, and hence (kt) must have two fixed points, as shown in
Figure 6. Therefore, in the case that (kt) has no fixed points, it is sucient only to consider the case
of ¯k < k1.
A.2 The derivatives of long-run production in Regime 2 Y2 in v
Here, we derive the sign of @Y2=@v. By considering that k

2 is a function of v, we obtain
@Y2
@v
=
(1   )

 
1
 1 + vk2   
!2 "@k2
@v
[ 1 + vk2   ]  
@(vk2)
@v
k2
#
:
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Figure 6: The phase diagram of kt when (kt) has no fixed points and ¯k < k1
The terms in the above bracket become
@k2
@v
( 1   )   k22:
Since the sign of @Y2=@v is the same as that of the above expression, we focus on this expression. By
totally dierentiating (15) in k2 and v, we obtain
dk2
dv =
Ak2
(1   )k2    Av
:
From Figure 2, we can show that dk2=dv > 0, and hence, (1 )k2  > Av. Recall that if et converges
to e,  1 + vk2 >  holds. By using dk

2=dv, (1   )k2  > Av holds, and from the definition of ¯k,
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k2 and Assumption 2, we obtain the following expression.
@Y2
@v
/ Ak

2
(1   )k2    Av
( 1   )   k22
=
1
(1   )k2    Av
[Ak2( 1   )   k22((1   )k2    Av)]
=
k2
(1   )k2    Av
[A( 1 + vk2   )   (1   )k21 ]
=
Ak2
(1   )k2    Av
[( 1 + vk2   )   (1   )( 1 + vk2)]
=
vA2k2
(1   )k2    Av
"
k2  
1
v
 


  1

!#
<
vA2k2
(1   )k2    Av
"
k2  
1
v
 

 + (1   )(1   )  
1

!#
=
vA2k2
(1   )k2    Av
h
k2   ¯k
i
;
where we use (15) in the third equality. The first inequality holds since = > =[ + (1   )(1   )]
and the last equality holds from the definition of ¯k in (14). Since k2 < ¯k from Figure 3, we conclude
that the last expression is negative. Therefore,
@Y2
@v
< 0:  (Ap.1)
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